

00880

1962/10/29

2115

UNCLASSIFIED

D
BIA3/5 (29)

revised 4/3/72
SS
S
G
M
S/L

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : IIR - Roger Hilsman

Row

OCT 29 1962

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Probe for Further US Guarantees to Castro.

TS authority to
() S or () C OADR
() S or () C OADR
() S or () C OADR
TS is
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE
() TS is

Igor Bubnov of the Soviet Embassy here on October 28 approached Tad Szulc (New York Times) with an inquiry as to US willingness to normalize relations with Castro. The Soviet official indicated that in exchange Castro would abstain from subversion, and restrain Havana radio broadcasts and "anti-American" activities in Latin America. He did not press Szulc to make soundings within the US Government.

The first question immediately raised by this approach is whether Moscow may be seeking to introduce new conditions for its removal of missile bases from Cuba. Bubnov specifically denied that this was intended by his questions. But as long as we have no direct knowledge of what is happening at the missile sites, we have only Khrushchev's word, and our conclusion based on that word, is that he is willing to cut his losses and remove the missiles. We cannot therefore exclude the possibility that Moscow may be seeking to inject a pretext for stalling on the delivery of its end of the October 27-28 arrangement.

On balance, however, we believe that Moscow will in fact redeem its pledge to remove the missiles without further haggling on the terms of the deal the one. (This does not rule out some haggling on the method and extent of US supervision, however.) We have reached this conclusion because we believe that Khrushchev's decision was based on a realization that the situation was fast moving to a US use of force to remove the missiles and that, unwilling to risk escalation, he concluded that the lesser evil was to take the initiative himself.

Reasons for Seeking Additional Guarantees

Although Khrushchev is undoubtedly acutely aware of the blow he has suffered in agreeing to remove his missiles in the face of a US threat to use force (a blow which he will continue to feel as the world receives running accounts of the dismantling and homeward voyage of the equipment), he probably feels that there is at least some compensation in the implied US guarantee of Castro which he has obtained. It would not, however, be unnatural for him to attempt to get even more. He has considerable incentive to make a try.

Castro almost certainly feels that he has been sold short, and his October 23 catalogue of actions which the US must take to give meaning to its guarantee not to invade, is an obvious effort to press the Soviets to obtain further benefits in the negotiations now unfolding.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/IR

REVIEWED by *Jh* DATE *4-4-88*
SECRET () DECLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DECLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DECLASSIFY () DECLASSIFY IN PART
FOR EO OF PA exemption (b)(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

TS authority to:

IS/IPC/COR 010 Date: 12-18-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
() RELEASE
() DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE
() DENY
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
() FOIA Exemptions
() PA Exemptions

~~SECRET~~

2 -

Moscow itself has a clear interest in expanding the US assurances into a clear US acceptance of a "socialist," Soviet-oriented and supported foothold in the Western hemisphere. For if Khrushchev has learnt from recent events that the US will not tolerate a strategic Soviet bridgehead at its doorstep, he also cannot fail to have noticed that the US -- and the OAS -- was galvanized into action only when the attempt was made to expand the ideological, political and economic bridgehead into an offensive military base.

Moscow probably feels that it has a plausible case when it seeks to extend the US assurance against invasion to include other, less drastic forms of hostile action against Castro. And it would not be out of character for it to seek to add to the plausibility of this case by offering restraint on Castro's subversive machinations in surrounding countries. (Historically, there is ample precedent in this sort of an arrangement in, for example, the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921.)

As Subnov emphasized, Moscow has always advocated a normalization of US-Cuban relations. [It is true that Castro, like other dictators, especially Communist ones, needs an enemy. However, a Castro accepted, however uneasily, by the US, is of greater value at this stage than a Castro ostracized, blockaded and solely dependent on Soviet support.] And to this end, Moscow and possibly Castro too, may well find it desirable to tone down Castro's external militance for the time being.

In sum, both Khrushchev and Castro have strong reasons to seek maximum US acceptance of the Cuban regime. Castro, no doubt, would like to see the US-Soviet arrangement now supposedly in force scuttled. But he is powerless to achieve this. He is seeking the next best thing. And so is Khrushchev.

Pitfalls

US guarantees to refrain from subversive action against Cuba in exchange for Castro guarantees to cease subversive radio broadcasts, guerrilla training in Cuba, and material support for the revolutionary left in Latin America would probably have the effect of putting the issue into a US-Cuban context rather than an OAS-Cuban context, where it is now, following the missile base crisis. In addition, any Castro pledges would be almost impossible to police in such a way as to find a bases for an indictment that would stand up. On the other hand, the Communists would claim violation of a US non-aggression pledge whenever and wherever refugee activities hostile to Castro occur.

Conclusion

While we cannot exclude Soviet efforts to introduce new conditions for the Soviet missile withdrawal (especially while we lack information on the status

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

of the sites), the Soviets, in probing our willingness to normalize relations with Castro, are evidently looking beyond the consummation of the present arrangement. In the end, they would probably accept any additional assurances and changes in US policy they can get. They will certainly insist on such changes if the US attempted to expand the missile agreement to include inhibitions on Castro's subversive activities.

The Soviet goal is to quiet down the present situation and to achieve maneuvering for Castro. If they succeed, they will probably feel that they have mitigated some of Castro's disenchantment and kept the way open for a promising Castro role in the Western Hemisphere despite the blow which they have now suffered.

~~SECRET~~